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Many Americans feel strongly that deregulation was to blame for the
financial collapse that occurred in 2008.1 Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has
echoed this view.2 Krugman believes the financial crisis arose because
"[r]egulation didn't keep up with the system," and "because of the
ideological environment of the times, there was no attempt to expand
regulation." In the period leading up to the crisis, Krugman likened buying
bank derivatives to "buying insurance for the Titanic from someone on the
Titanic."
In an effort to correct the problem, regulators across the globe have
taken measures to strengthen the financial regulatory system.5 Many of the
new financial regulations have been targeted at banking institutions. Basel
III is a set of regulations that imposes more stringent standards for banks
through measures aimed at increasing capital holdings, improving liquidity
and preventing overleveraging. While the Basel III requirements seek to
effectuate financial stability, they cannot do so without generating some
significant costs, many of which will be pushed on to consumers-
particularly small businesses.
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I. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS BASEL III?
Basel III is a set of regulatory reforms meant to address many of the
issues associated with the recent financial crisis in the banking sector.9 The
first Basel Capital Accord was developed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1988 to address concerns arising from
deregulation in the financial sector.'o Responding to the most recent
banking crisis, the BCBS, whose membership is consists of banking and
prudential regulators from over twenty-five countries," has devised new
regulations aimed at ensuring that banks will maintain financial stability
during times of economic turmoil. 2 Basel III is the most recent installment
of these Basel Accords and is meant to address many of the shortcomings
of its predecessor, Basel II, which primarily addressed internal ratings,
trade book and market risk and securitization.' 3 Specifically, Basel III seeks
to improve upon the quantity and quality of capital that banks have been
required to hold under the Basel II framework by redefining core Tier I
capital, restructuring bank liabilities and risk management and providing
additional stability through capital buffer requirements. 14 Furthermore,
while the prior Basel regulations focus exclusively on microprudential
measures, Basel III also incorporates macroprudential standards into its
regulatory framework to reduce systemic risk.'5
9 ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCING SMEs AND ENTREPRENEURS
2012: AN OECD SCOREBOARD 32 (2012).
10 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 1.
" Id.
12 ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9.
" RICARDO FABIANI, DUN & BRADSTREET, THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF 'BASEL III' 4
(2010).
14 See King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 3; Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed, and
Why Any Basel III Is Doomed 24 (Global Econ. Governance Programme, Working
Paper No. 2009/52, 2009).
1 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 3. Macroprudential regulation focuses on the
health of the financial system as a whole, whereas microprudential regulation
focuses on the stability of the financial system's component parts. Macroprudential
Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/macroprudential-
analysis.asp#axzz2LO3d6VgV (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); Microprudential
Regulation, QFINANCE, http://www.qfinance.com/dictionary/microprudential-
regulation (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
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II. REQUIREMENTS UNDER BASEL III
A. Capitalization Requirements
1. Core Capital Requirements
One of the most significant changes in Basel III is the introduction of a
stringent definition of core Tier 1 capital. While Basel III maintains the
basic capital standard of Basel I and II, which requires banks to retain total
capital of approximately 8% of their risk-weighted assets (RWAs),16 Basel
III has imposed new limitations in terms of capital composition. Basel III
requires that at least 75% of a bank's total capital consist of Tier 1 capital,
while the remaining 25% may consist of Tier 2 capital.17 Under Basel III,
Tier 1 capital is "going-concern" capital consisting primarily of common
equity-i.e. common stock, common stock surplus and retained earnings;' 8
furthermore, common equity must make up at least 50% of a bank's total
capital and at least 75% of a bank's Tier 1 capital. 19 The remaining Tier 1
capital may consist of preferred stock or other forms of paid-in capital that
fall outside the common equity classification. In contrast to core Tier 1
capital, Tier 2 is "gone-concern" capital, because although it provides some
additional capital cushion, it will quickly be absorbed by a bank as it
approaches insolvency; Tier 2 capital primarily consists of lower forms of
equity and junior liability.2 0 Under Basel III, these core capital requirements
are scheduled to be phased in starting in 2013, with complete
implementation by 2015.21
2. Valuation ofRisk- Weighted Assets
RWA values are fundamental to Basel III's capital requirements and
can be determined by assessing Counterparty Credit Risks (CCRs).22 RWA
values can be determined by one of two methods: the standardized method
or the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB). 2 3 The standardized method is
the default method used by the majority of banks, which assesses CCRs
through use of external credit ratings: banks determine the value of RWAs
first by determining the specific class of asset (e.g., retail, sovereign
16 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 3.
" Id.
" Id. at 4.
'
9 Id. at 3.20 Id. at 4.
21 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 28 & annex 4
(2011).
22 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 7.
23 ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 33.
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government), then by looking to the credit rating ascribed to the
counterparty by an external credit assessment institution.24 Large,
sophisticated banking institutions may elect to use the IRB, which uses
internal risk models to determine the capital needed to offset the RWAs,
based upon the bank's estimates of the probability of loan default and
exposure to loss. 25
3. Ratio of Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets
Under the Basel III standards, banks are required to maintain a
minimum ratio of 4.5% Tier 1 common equity to RWAs.26 In conjunction
with the 4.5% common equity minimum, Basel III also requires that banks
maintain a capital conservation buffer in the way of an additional 2.5% of
Tier 1 capital, in order to further ensure stability in times of economic
duress.27 Effectively, the Tier 1 common equity ratio and capital
conservation buffer will require banks to maintain a total ratio of 7% Tier 1
capital to RWAs at any given time.2 8 In times of exigency, banks may dip
below 7%, but will be expected to replenish the capital buffer to remain in
compliance.29
4. Additional Capital Requirements
Together with Basel III's microprudential capital requirements,
standards such as the countercyclical capital buffer aim to achieve the
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector during times of
widespread credit growth. 30 The countercyclical capital buffer is a measure
which countries may choose to impose during times of excessive credit
growth and will require additional Tier 1 holdings ranging from 0% to 2.5%
of RWA.3 1
Another macroprudential measure put forth by Basel III is a surcharge
on Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (GSIFIs). For
certain GSIFIs, a further 1% to 2.5% of Tier 1 capital could be required
depending on the bank's size, global activity and the availability of
competition.32 In total, these measures would require all banks to hold 7%
Tier 1 capital and to hold up to 9.5% during times of heightened risk, with
24 id
25 id.
26 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 5.27 Id.
28 See id.
29 d30 ACCENTURE, BASEL III HANDBOOK 25 (2012).
31 Id.
32 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 33.
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capital requirements possibly reaching as high as 12% for GSIFIs.3 3 The
countercyclical buffer and GSIFI surcharge would be phased in later than
the core capital requirements, between 2016 and 2018.34
B. Leverage Ratio
In addition to the risk-based capital requirements, Basel III has
introduced a non-risk-based leverage ratio designed to supplement the
capitalization standards by providing a check for efficacy of capital
adequacy measurements.35 At this stage, use of the leverage ratio is largely
at the discretion of financial regulators, with reporting requirements
beginning in January of 2013 and the ratio ultimately becoming binding by
2018.36 A leverage ratio of at least 3% is suggested, which will be
calculated by dividing a bank's Tier 1 capital measurement by its
percentage of total exposure (including both balance sheet and off-balance
sheet items).
C. Liquidity Requirements
Illiquidity was another significant problem encountered during the
recent crisis in the banking sector; many banks found that they could not
quickly turn their assets into cash and instead had to rely on central bank
lending facilities to resolve issues with short-term lending.38 Basel III has
developed liquidity requirements-a liquidity coverage ratio and net stable
funding ratio-to ensure that banks maintain a sufficient level of
unencumbered liquid assets at any given time. 39 The liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) requires a bank to maintain high-quality liquid assets that are equal
to or greater than its net total cash outflows for the next thirty-day period.4 0
Net cash outflows are defined as expected cash outflows minus total
expected cash inflows, up to a cap of 75% of expected outflows; in other
words, banks would always be required to maintain at least 25% of their
expected cash outflows as liquid assets at any given time.41 The LCR is
scheduled to take effect beginning in 2015, with banks being required to
meet 60% of the LCR obligations at this point, and it will become fully
33 Id. at 33 tbl.3.1.
34 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 21, at annex 4.
35 ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 34.
361 d.; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 21, at annex 4.
37 ACCENTURE, supra note 30, at 32.
38 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 9.
39 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 34.
40 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 9.
41 Id.
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phased in by 2019.42 This timeline represents a significant departure from
the original plan, which envisioned mandatory applicability of the LCR in
2015.43
Like the LCR, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is another Basel III
mechanism designed to ensure a bank maintains adequate liquidity."
Whereas the LCR deals with short-term liquidity (thirty days), the NSFR is
designed to ensure a bank has sufficient longer-term liquidity (one year).45
The NSFR is determined by comparing the available amount of stable
funding over the required amount of stable funding for a one-year period.46
The available amount of stable funding must equal at least 100% of the
required amount of stable funding.47 The NSFR, like the LCR, will begin
with an observation period48 but will not become mandatory until 2018 .
III. ECONOMIC IMPACT UNDER BASEL III
If Basel III is ultimately successful in achieving its purpose, businesses
may profit in the long-term on account of the economic stability the new
standards will provide.o Some proponents of the new regulations have
argued that this stability will prove particularly beneficial to small
businesses, which are more affected during times of economic crisis than
larger, more established companies.51 However, many critics are skeptical
that the Basel III reforms will actually harm-rather than benefit-
businesses by causing a significant reduction in lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and new business enterprises.52
A. Greater Impact on Smaller Lending Institutions
The new Basel III capital requirements may prove especially
problematic for smaller financial institutions, such as community banks and
42 Jim Brunsden, Giles Broom & Ben Moshinsky, Banks Win 4-Year Delay as Bank
Liquidity Rule Loosened, BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.businessweek.
coim/news/2013-01-06/banks-win-watered-down-liquidity-rule-after-basel-group-
deal.
43 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 21, at annex 4.
4 King & Tarbert, supra note 7, at 9.
45 Id. at 10.
46 d.
47 d.48 Id. at app. D.
49
so ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 34-35.
5' Id.
52 Id. at 35.
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credit unions.53 Smaller regional banks will be uniquely impacted by Basel
III for a variety of reasons. First, low interest rates and high unemployment
have had a disproportionately negative impact on small banks,5 4 and the
Basel III standards will exacerbate this financial stress. Second, the RWA
model will have greater impact on regional banks because retail customers
and SMEs represent a large portion of their customer base. Furthermore,
small banks, with access to fewer resources, will have difficulties raising
the additional amounts of capital necessary to offset the risk of lending to
small businesses. 6 As many small businesses and startups rely on loans
from local banks, the effect may be that these companies are never able to
get up and running.
Community banks have already faced capital issues that have curbed
small business lending.58 Recognizing the negative effects of this
undercapitalization, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has already paid
out over four billion dollars to community banks through the Small
Business Lending Fund (established as part of the Small Business Jobs Act
of 201 0).59 The Basel III requirements may further exacerbate the
undercapitalization of smaller lending institutions, making SME financing
even more challenging. Demonstrating the difficulties that the new
standards pose for community banks, in September 2012 the business loan
approval rating for credit unions dropped for the fourth consecutive month
to its lowest rate since June 201 1.60 Similarly, the number of loans
approved by small banks also dropped.
Many community bank coalitions, such as the Independent Community
Bankers of America (ICBA), have expressed intense disapproval of the
Basel III reforms and have petitioned for modification of the standards as
53 Shea Dittrich, How Basel III Capital Requirements Hurt Community Banks, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/how-basel-
iii-capital-requirements-hurt-community-banks-1053011-1 .html.
54 Alex Bryan, Regional Banks: Small Enough to Succeed, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec.
21, 2012), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1080831-regional-banks-small-enough-
to-succeed?source=bloomberg.
5 Id.
56 Howard Schneider, Capital Trouble, INDEP. BANKER, Oct. 2012, at 23, 24-26.
s7 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 39 (emphasizing SME
reliance on financing from small local banks).
58 See generally Small Business Lending Fund, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/Small-Business-
Lending-Fund.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
59 id
60 Michelle A. Samaad, Alternative Lenders Continue to Beat Credit Unions, Banks
in Business Loan Approvals, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.cuti
mes.com/2012/10/10/alternative-lenders-continue-to-beat-credit-unions?ref-hp.
61 Id.
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applied to community banks.62 In addition to highlighting the greater
burdens these regulations will pose to community banks, the ICBA has
pointed to issues of fairness with the new regulations. Namely, the ICBA
has pointed to the fact that large, systemically important banks were the
major culprits behind the financial crisis and that community banks did not
engage in the sort of reckless lending practices that led to the economic
downturn.6
Other commentators are less sympathetic to the plight of community
banks and are pushing for the adoption of more uniform regulations.
Experts in the United Kingdom have noted that creating separate rules for
large banks would be ,roblematic because it would increase the risk of
"accidental arbitrage."6 Although the general sentiment within the United
States has been that community banks should be subject to different
regulatory requirements than their larger counterparts, most commentators
feel that increased capital standards are necessary to some extent.67
Commentators who are particularly opposed to exemptions for community
banks note that in the period leading up to the financial crisis, many
community banks went overboard with their lending practices. 68 These
critics cite this imprudent lending as the ultimate cause for the failure of
several of these institutions and their subsequent indebtedness to the
Treasury Department under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).69
B. Small and New Businesses Will Be Assigned High Risk Weights
The new regulations will not only disproportionately affect community
banks, but also they will disproportionately impact SMEs and startup
companies. Small businesses and individuals will be ascribed a retail risk
rating of 75%, provided the bank's retail portfolio is diverse and no loan
exceeds one million Euros.70 However, if the bank does not meet these
62 Community Bank Petition to the Federal Reserve, OCC, and the FDIC, INDEP.
CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., http://www.icba.org/BaselIlIPetition/petition.cfm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013).
63 Id.
SId.
Richard Crump, Separate Rules for Banks a "Mistake, " Lawson Told, ACCT.
AGE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/analysis/2238754/
separate-rules-for-banks-a-mistake-lawson-told; Vincent Ryan, Man Up,
Community Bankers, CFO.CoM (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www3.cfo.com/blogs/
banking-cap-markets/banking--capital-markets/2012/1 1/Man-Up-Community-
Bankers.66 Crump, supra note 65.
Ryan, supra note 65.
68id.
69 id.
70 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 9, at 36.
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conditions, an SME loan will be assigned a risk weight of 100%.71 In
contrast, loans to sovereign governments and central banks with a high
credit rating would have a risk weight of 0%,72 and large companies with a
high credit rating would have a risk weight of only 20%.73 These risk
weight differentials would have a huge impact in terms of capital
requirements needed to offset loans to small businesses. While financing an
SME could require the bank to hold up to 7% of the loan amount as capital
(100% risk weight multiplied by 7% capital), a loan to a large company
may require only 1.4% (20% risk weight multiplied by 7% capital). Thus, a
$100,000 loan could be made to a large company with an AAA to AA-
credit rating-with $1400 in capital needed to offset the loan-or to a
sovereign government-requiring no offsetting capital-whereas a loan in
this amount to an SME would require the bank to hold $5250 (for SMEs
with a 75% risk weight) or $7000 (for SMEs with a 100% risk weight) in
capital.74
C. Adverse Economic Impact
1. Generally
While Basel III is designed to promote long-term global economic
stability, the immediate impact will likely be to stunt economic growth.$
The Institute of International Finance (HF) published a report addressing
the impact financial regulatory changes like Basel III will have upon the
global economy.7 6 The IIF report found that some measure of financial
regulatory reform was necessary to ensure long-term stability in the
financial sector. However, the IIF concluded that the current measures,
like Basel III, may not facilitate these ends. Generally, the IIF report
concluded that the current global economy is ill-equipped to handle the new
regulations and that in the short-term, these changes would place even
heavier burdens on an already faltering economy, prohibiting growth.
Furthermore, the IIF report estimated that in the United States, Europe,
71 Id.
72 id.
7 1 d. at 37.
74 See id. at 33-37.
7 Brooke Masters, FSA Eases Bank Rules to Boost Lending, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49353389/.
76 See generally INST. OF INT'L FIN., THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY OF CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Sept.
2011).
" Id. at ii.
78 id.
79 d
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Japan and Switzerland there could be a realized loss of up to 3.2% of GDP
over the next five years, attributable to the new financial regulations.o
The 1IF report found that the new regulatory reforms would reduce
overall economic activity in two ways: first, by raising the cost of extending
credit, and second, by reducing the overall availability of credit.8 ' The
transactional cost of the regulatory reforms will be passed through to
borrowers in the form of higher interest rates. Furthermore, in order to
comply with the new regulations, banks will change their business models
in ways which are not profit maximizing, reducing retention of higher-risk
assets in favor of low-yielding claims.83 In support of this conclusion, the
IIF found that, thus far, banks that have had difficulties meeting capital
requirements have declined to lend to risky borrowers, such as SMEs, and
have extended less credit in general.8 4 In addition, banks may find that the
simplest way to comply with the liquidity requirements is by reducing
loans.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a report criticizing
the IIF findings for their short-term focus and failure to take into account
other cost-reducing measures that banks might employ to lessen economic
harm.86 Although the IMF report concluded that the new regulations would
produce long-term benefits in terms of market stability, the report
acknowledged that the regulations would also generate significant costs,
which it likened to "insurance premiums."8 The IMF found that there
would not be a 100% pass-through to third party borrowers in terms of
credit pricing and availability and that the regulations would cause some
increase in the costs of obtaining credit and some decrease in credit
availability.8 8 Furthermore, many of the other methods the IMF report
pointed to in relation to banks' cost mitigation strategies could have issues
of feasibility or raise other economic concerns. Examples of these cost
mitigation strategies include reducing expenses, restructuring the business,
absorbing costs by lowering returns to shareholders and meeting the
requirements through technicalities.89 Even with the use of cost mitigation
80 id
81 Id. at 38.
82 INST. OF INT'L FIN., supra note 76, at 38.
83 id
8 Id. at 33.
81 Id. at 40.86 ANDRA OLIVEIRA SANTOS & DOUGLAS ELLIOTr, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 6 (2012).8 1 d. at 4.8 Id. at 8.89 Id. at 8-9.
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strategies, the bottom line is that Basel III will increase costs for banks and
these costs will be passed on to borrowers. 90
Other commentators have also pointed to the economic shortcomings of
the Basel III reforms.91 Although the Basel III capital requirements and risk
management standards aim to prevent future bank failures, their effect may
be to further weaken the financial sector.9 2 First, the new standards will
result in smaller, weaker banks being forced out of the market by larger
banks that are better able to comply with the standards. 93 Second, the
regulations will place further pressure on bank operations and
profitability.94 Finally, the regulations will reduce banks' lending
capacity.95 These burdens will be reflected upon the economy as a whole,
which will suffer because of decreased consumer credit availability and
diminished monetary flow resulting from banks' capital retention.9 6
2. Adverse Impact on Small Business
Small businesses in particular will bear the brunt of the economic
consequences in the form of higher lending rates and decreased credit
availability.97 Because SMEs will have high risk weights-requiring greater
amounts of capital-banks will be forced to cut down on the amount of
98lending they extend to these recipients. This decreased SME lending is
problematic for a variety of reasons. First, there is a fairness consideration:
SMEs were not the cause of the recent financial crisis; however, SMEs
were the businesses hit the hardest.99 Decreased credit availability will
impose greater burdens on small businesses that are already struggling
financially. A second consideration involves the role of SMEs in terms of
the overall economy. Globally, SMEs account for approximately 50% of all
private sector output and 63% of private sector employment.100 If many of
these SMEs are unable to secure financing because of the new regulations,
the result will be diminished output and employment globally. Finally,
while some concessions in terms of small business growth may be
90 Id. at 4.
91 Shawn Baldwin, Basel Barriers: How Capital Requirement Would Impede
Progress in the Sovereign Debt Crisis, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/shawnbaldwin/2012/10/15/basel-barriers/.
92 d
93 id
94 d
95 Id.
96 d
97 Schizas, supra note 8.
98 Id. at 4.
99 Ass'N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCTS., Framing the Debate: Basel III and
SdEs, ACCT. FUTURES, July 2011, at 3.
'oo Id. at 5.
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defensible to yield greater market stability, the capital requirements are not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to further this goal.'
Banks' responses to the regulations thus far have bolstered this theory.
Rather than raising additional capital, many banks have chosen to maintain
capital close to pre-Basel III levels, instead of reducing RWAs.102 In
particular, banks have cut back on "riskier" lending, such as loans to small
businesses. 03 Furthermore, some lenders intend to comply with the new
regulations by shedding all business loans other than loans to their core
business customers.'" While SME lending has declined because of the risk
weight system, the risk rating ascribed to these assets under Basel III's
framework may be a poor reflection of actual risks associated with the
loans. 05 Hence, regulatory compliance will be at the detriment of many
SMEs and will not necessarily be a benefit in terms of risk mitigation and
market stability. 0 6
The United Kingdom has already experienced negative economic
consequences as a result of implementing the Basel III regulations.'0o
Specifically, U.K. regulators have found that overly aggressive
implementation of the new standards has caused corporate lending to
decline.'0 As part of a concentrated effort to promote increased business
lending, the Financial Services Authority has relaxed the capital, leveraging
and liquidity requirements for U.K. banks.'09 Similar to the situation in the
United Kingdom, there is a real possibility that implementation of the new
standards in the United States could lead to a double-dip recession"o if
companies are unable to secure necessary funding."'
Similarly, European Union lawmakers have found it necessary to lower
the capital buffer requirements in regards to small business lending by
reducing SME risk weighting down to 30%.112 This is because, in spite of
101 Schizas, supra note 8, at 3-5.
102 1d at8.
103 Id.
10 Both FinMin and RBI Want Banks to Shed Their Non-Core Business, ECON.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-
26/news/36008176_sector-banks-basel-iii-psbs.
105 Schizas, supra note 8, at 8.
10 oid
107 See Masters, supra note 75.
los See id.
110 The term "double-dip recession" refers to a recession, followed by a short-lived
recovery, followed by another recession.
"' Masters, supra note 75.
112 Claire Davenport, EU Lawmakers Agree on Softer Capital Buffers for SME
Loans, Fox Bus. (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/10/05/eu-
lawmakers-agree-on-softer-capital-buffers-for-sme-loans/.
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SMEs' central importance in the European economy, small business
lending has declined by 20% since the European Union began
implementing the Basel regulations."' Furthermore, during this time frame
SMEs have also been subject to higher interests rates and shorter maturities
than larger, well-established companies." 4 Ensuring the success of these
SMEs is important to achieving a healthy economy, as SMEs contribute
significantly to innovation, job creation and social stability."'
Another significant problem will be increased competition among
SMEs and startup businesses vying for lending as a result of decreased
credit availability.1 6 Small local businesses will be assigned the same risk
weights as high-potential startups." 7 The result may be that local "mom and
pops," who can expect only modest financial returns, will be squeezed out
by startups with high profit potential." 8
The impact of Basel III in the European Union demonstrates that in
addition to decreased small business lending, the transactional costs of the
new regulations will also be pushed on to small businesses and other
enterprises with relatively higher risk weights."' Rather than bear the cost
of the regulations themselves, banks will impose additional costs on
borrowers. Business consumers will face higher interest rates on loans in
addition to more fees.120
3. U.S. Regulators' Difering Opinions on Implementation
While the situation in the European Union and United Kingdom has
demonstrated the threat the Basel III regulations pose to small businesses,12 1
some U.S. officials are pushing for rapid implementation of the new
reforms, in addition to even stricter regulations than required under Basel
111.122 The Systemic Risk Council, led by former FDIC Chairman Sheila
Bair, is urging that U.S. regulators implement the Basel III regulations more
n13 id.
114 id
" Andrew Sheng, Shadow Banking . .. or Ghosts in the Machine?, STAR ONLINE
(Dec. 22, 2012), http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/12/22/
business/1248311 5&sec=business.
116 Aaron Chatterji, Why Washington Has It Wrong on Small Business, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://online.wsj.com.
"n See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 9, at 33.
118 Chatterji, supra note 116.
119 See Davenport, supra note 112.
12o Victor Nava, Basel III Hurts Community Banks and Consumers, REAL CLEAR
MARKETS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/11/
01/baseliii hurts_communitybanks and consumers_99966.html.
121 Davenport, supra note 112; Masters, supra note 75.
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rapidly than would otherwise be required under the Basel timeframe.'2 3
Additionally, the Systemic Risk Council is advocating stricter leveraging
requirements, "which would limit banks' assets to 12 times their capital,
rather than 33 times their capital," as required under Basel 111.124
Should the Systemic Risk Council's suggestions be adopted, they may
provide additional safeguards in terms of bank stability, but they will
inevitably place greater burdens on small businesses and startup companies
that are unable to obtain bank credit, or who find the financing options
overly cost prohibitive.125 Other individuals, such as FDIC Director Thomas
Hoenig, are less optimistic that the Basel III regulations can effectively
resolve the issues in the banking sector. 126 Hoenig feels that the Basel
regulations are overly complex and that the capital requirements are not
well-tailored to solving the problems in the banking sector that emerged
during the financial crisis.12 7 Instead, Hoenig believes long-term stability in
the financial sector could be better achieved using a straight-forward
method: one which looks at the ratio of tangible equity to tangible assets
and emphasizes the importance of supervisory oversight to ensure
compliance.12 1
D. Mitigating the Burdens ofRegulatory Compliance
One possible solution for banks may be to secure SME loans with
government-backed guarantees.12 9 Since governments with AAA credit
ratings have risk weights of zero, a government guarantee would eliminate
the risk associated with the guaranteed portion of the SME loan, thereby
reducing the bank's overall capital requirement. 130 However, this approach
would only work in situations where the government was willing to
guarantee these small business loans and had a good credit rating. While
government-backed loans would necessitate the least amount of capital, it
may also be possible to have SME loans backed by other, less-risky
123 Rick Rothacker, Council Urges Tighter Capital Standards for U.S. Banks,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/05/bank-
regulations-idUSLIE8L5 I DS20121005.
124 id
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guarantors,' 3 ' such as larger companies. While this would not eliminate the
need for capital, it may reduce capital requirements to a level that would no
longer disincentivize lending to small businesses. Furthermore, other forms
of collateral could be used for similar risk mitigating effects; for example, a
business owner may give the bank a security interest in his or her
residential property.13 2
1. Regulatory Arbitrage
On an international level, the Basel III standards will have a disparate
impact, with varying costs of implementation and profitability across the
board.13 3 For some states, the costs of implementation, supervisory
oversight and decreased competitiveness may outweigh the benefits.134
Hence, while Basel III is largely designed as a mandatory, rather than
discretionary set of standards, 35 those countries that are burdened the most
by the new regulations will be the most reluctant-and the slowest-to
implement them.136 Because there will inevitably be variation in the rate
and method in which different countries choose to adopt the Basel III
regulations, banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage to get around these
standards. 3 Supporting banks' ability to engage in arbitrage is the fact that
many countries (e.g., Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Austria
and the United States) have experienced a push from regulators to impose
more stringent requirements than those submitted under Basel III, whereas
in other countries (e.g., New Zealand) regulators have said they do not
intend to implement many of the new standards.138
Under the Basel III standards, the ability to engage in regulatory
arbitrage is particularly feasible because the risk-weight system does not
reflect the actual risk a bank incurs in extending loans or credit.'39 Because
131 id
132 id
"3 Narissa Lyngen, Recent Development, Basel III: Dynamics ofState
Interpretation, 53 HARv. INT'L L.J. 519, 522 (2012).
134 See id. ("Variations among states' domestic regulated sectors mean . .. distinct
costs of implementation for each state and implications for the international
competitiveness and profitability of that state's regulated sector .... [S]ome states
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face a disproportionate amount of the costs.").
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of this, banks will have an incentive to take on loans whose actual risk is
higher than the risk weight ascribed under the Basel III standards.14 0 For
example, a thirty-year amortizing mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio of
60% to 80% will be ascribed a risk weight of 50%, while an interest-only
loan with the same loan-to-value ratio will be ascribed a risk weight of
100%.141 If the actual risk of the interest-only loan is less than twice the risk
of the thirty-year amortizing loan, a bank will approve the riskier, thirty-
year amortizing loan rather than the interest-only loan.14 2 This sort of
regulatory arbitrage will allow banks to increase profit potential without a
corresponding increase in capital holdings.143 Engaging in such behavior is
problematic, however. It will, to some extent, render Basel III's risk-
mitigation goals ineffective.
Further enabling banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage is the lack of a
uniform risk-calculation system across the board.'" Stefan Ingves,
Chairman of the BCBS, has noted that since the implementation of Basel
III, there has been "material variation" across the industry in the way that
banks calculate the risk of their assets. 14 Ingves has proposed that this wide
variation could be remedied through "tougher disclosure rules or limitations
in the [risk-modeling] choices for banks."l46 In the meantime, significant
divergences in bank compliance continue.14 7 U.S. bankers, including the
CEO of JPMorgan Chase, have noted that the "flexible implementation of
previous rounds of Basel capital rules . . . has allowed European lenders to
hold less capital" than U.S. banks.148 Additionally, banks in both the United
Kingdom and United States have fallen short of meeting the January 2013
deadline for implementing many of the new regulations.149 Until regulators
find a way to rectify these disparities, there will continue to be a strong
incentive for regulatory arbitrage." 0
Many lending institutions have begun fashioning innovative methods to
eschew the liquidity requirements.' 5 ' JPMorgan Chase has developed a
system to avoid the liquidity issues by converting variable rate demand
140id
141Id.
142 Id
143 Id.
" See Ben Moshinsky, Banks May Face Limits on Risk Calculations, Basel Chief
Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2013), http://washpost.bloomberg.com.
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bonds (VRDBs) into callable commercial paper with a variable length of
maturity of no less than thirty-one days. 15 2 At least thirty-one days prior to
the date of maturity, the issuer would call the paper.153 Because this call
option is exercised outside the thirty-day window, it in effect creates an
exemption from inclusion in the LCR calculation.' 54 If companies such as
JPMorgan Chase are able to successfully employ these methods, it may
help banks meet the new liquidity requirements, in turn creating greater
credit availability for businesses.155
In addition to their VRDB conversion technique, JPMorgan Chase has
fashioned a similar callable commercial product, aimed at allowing
municipal users to achieve floating rates. 56 Using this product, JPMorgan
Chase acted as a remarketing agent together with Morgan Stanley, allowing
the Sunshine State Governmental Financing Commission to issue $115
million in debt to the city of Orlando.'s This callable commercial product
works similarly to the convertible VRDBs (falling outside the applicable
thirty-day window), but whereas the predecessors to this deal have had
maturities of 60-90 days, the municipal deal had a maturity of 136 days. 58
If companies such as JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley continue to
successfully employ these methods, it may not only help municipal
customers, but could also ease the financial burdens on SME borrowers.159
Front-loading is another practice many banks have adopted in order to
avoid the new regulations. 160 Front-loading involves issuing large amounts
of debt instruments just prior to the switch-over to the new capital standards
at the beginning of 2013.161 Since Basel III adopts a stricter definition of
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, issuing debt just prior to the date in which the new
standards became binding (January 1, 2013) prevented the exclusion of
these debt instruments from a bank's capital holdings.162 Canadian lenders
such as the Royal Bank of Canada and Canadian Imperial Bank of
152 Robert Slavin, Moody's: New Liquidity Structure Is Good for Variable-Rate
Issuers, BOND BUYER (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_191/
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1044566-1.html.
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Commerce have adopted the front-loading method by issuing a high
number of domestic bonds.'63 In December 2012, Canadian banks issued
$4.6 billion CAD in domestic bonds, which was more than double the
amount issued in December 201 1.'6 Similarly, there has been a rush among
Chinese banks to sell subordinated debts prior to the January 1 effective
date for the new capital standards.165
There will inevitably be opportunities for regulatory arbitrage under
Basel III because of differential rates and methods of implementation, and
other factors such as the inability of the RWA model to perfectly reflect
actual risks.'66 This regulatory arbitrage is problematic because banks may
be able to comply with the letter of the law without complying with the
spirit of the law-that is, by failing to actually mitigate risk. Furthermore,
regulatory arbitrage may result in private benefits for banks and borrowers,
at a cost to society as a whole in the form of decreased economic
stability. However, the "optimal amount of regulatory arbitrage is not
zero," and regulatory arbitrage may be beneficial to the extent that it
benefits social welfare.' 6 8 Specifically, regulatory arbitrage may be
advantageous to the extent that it fosters economic growth (or at least,
minimizes economic harm) by increasing credit availability among SMEs
and by reducing transaction costs. However, the optimal level of regulatory
arbitrage must be small enough to yield a significant decrease in overall
risk, so as to prevent banks from being put back into the sort of precarious
financial position that led to the recent crisis in the banking sector, which
prompted the adoption of Basel III.
E. Alternative Financing for Small Businesses
While banks are likely to develop some measures making it possible to
extend credit to SMEs, it is inevitable that Basel III will, to some extent,
decrease overall credit availability for small businesses.169 Given the added
burdens associated with obtaining bank financing, an increasing number of
small businesses have been looking to alternative sources of funding.17 0
Alternative funding may be a particularly feasible solution in the United
States, because of the availability of alternative debt intermediation
sources.171 Since Basel III was passed, many of these alternative lending
I63 id.
14id.
165 Wang Jiamei, Banks Dash to Place Junior Debt, GLOBAL TIMES (Dec. 24,
2012),.http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/752000.shtml.
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sources, such as micro-lenders, accounts receivable financers, merchant
cash advance lenders and community development financial institutions,
have experienced a surge in demand from SMEs.172 Small business owners
have found some of these alternative lending sources particularly desirable
because of the greater loan approval rating and more flexible terms and
rates. 7 1
1. Venture Capital and Angel Investors
Decreased business lending under Basel III will inevitably cause some
SMEs to turn away from bank financing in search of alternative options.17 4
These SMEs may turn to some of the more conventional sources of
increased cash flow such as factoring,175 purchase-order financing'76 and
inventory-backed financing, or may look to less traditional sources like
crowdfunding.' 78 However, the most feasible alternative source of funding
will likely be capital investments in the form of venture capital or angel
funding. '7
For businesses, there may be some significant benefits and drawbacks
to consider before turning to venture capital. 8 0 The most palpable
advantage is that venture capital can provide the necessary financing to get
a business up and running when the business is unable to secure credit
through other means. Venture capitalists also tend to have deep pockets,
with investments averaging between $500,000 and $5,000,000.181 Another
benefit is that venture capitalists generally have good business connections,
which may help to provide contacts and guidance for a new business, as
172 Samaad, supra note 60.
173 Id.
174 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
175 Factoring involves the sale of accounts receivable to a financial intermediary (a
factor), at a discount, in exchange for cash.
176 With purchase-order financing, the financier guarantees the buyer's order and
pays for the product to be manufactured. When the company receives payment
from the buyer, the financier takes its cut and the company gets the rest of the
proceeds.
177 Inventory-backed financing allows a company to obtain loans or credit by
offering its inventory as collateral to protect against a default in payment.
178 Crowdfunding involves the use of small amounts of capital from a large pool of
investors to finance a new business venture.
' Mike Michalowicz, Small Business Funding Options: Venture Capital vs. Angel
Funding, TOILET PAPER ENTREPRENEUR (May 5, 2012), http://www.toiletpaper
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well as another possible source of investors.182 Other aspects of venture
capital investment are less favorable for businesses. Venture capitalists
have high expectations for returns from the companies they invest in and
often require 50% or more of future profits.183 With equity stakes this high,
control of the company may effectively shift from the hands of the original
business owner to the investor.184 Furthermore, venture capitalists like to
take their time before committing their money and often take at least six
months before reaching a decision.'85
Like venture capitalists, angel investors may provide a source of capital
for startup businesses that are unable to secure sufficient funding through
loans or other means. 86 Angel investors will generally contribute $250,000
to $500,000 to an early stage company and sometimes pool funds together
with other angels to invest even larger amounts, possibly in the millions.187
In exchange for these contributions, angel investors take an equity stake in
the company, usually from 20% to 60%, depending on the amount of the
initial contribution.188 Not only do angels offer startups a source of much
needed capital, but they are also able to provide guidance and support to the
businesses they fund, as many angels are current or former entrepreneurs. 8 9
The downside is that finding an angel investor is a highly competitive
process, with only around a 5% success rate among those companies
seeking funding.190 Furthermore, angel investing is only a feasible solution
for a very limited category of businesses-certain startups who can
demonstrate the kind of profit potential necessary to make the investment
worthwhile-generally, this entails the ability to eventually go public or
sell the company.191
2. Non-Bank Financial Institutions
a. Business Development Corporations
Business Development Corporations (BDCs) may provide another
viable source of funding for businesses that are considered too high-risk to
182 id.
183 Id.
18 id.
185 Michalowicz, supra note 179.
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2012), http://online.wsj.com.
187
189
190 Id
19 Id
2013 The Negative Impact of Basel III on 203
Small Business Financing
receive a traditional bank loan under the new Basel III standards.'92 BDCs
are publicly traded investment companies that provide funding to
businesses in the private sector.193 Although BDCs' cost of capital is higher
than a traditional bank loan, they offer an advantage in terms of their
greater willingness to finance small businesses and startup companies and
greater flexibility when it comes to negotiating payments with companies
that are struggling to meet their financial obligations.' 94
b. Shadow Banking Sector
Some evidence indicates that since the adoption of Basel III, the
shadow banking sector has grown larger than before the financial crisis.'95
This may be due, in part, to the fact that Basel III does not affect non-bank
financial institutions. As non-bank financial institutions are not required to
comply with the capital holding requirements, there is a possibility that
shadow banking firms will see an opportunity in the market and begin
extending greater amounts of credit to SMEs and startup companies. 96
Specifically, shadow banks such as hedge funds, unregulated investment
funds and other limited-purpose finance companies can use investor funds
to engage in direct lending to small business, free from the stringent
standards to which banking institutions will be subject.'97 The ability of the
shadow banking sector to engage in this sort of lending is problematic
because Basel III's capital standards cannot effectively create economic
stability if the financial system as a whole is overleveraged.19 8
192 Vincent Ryan, When Banks Won't Touch Your Company, CFO.COM (Oct. 10,
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IV. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS UNDER BASEL III
U.S. financial regulators have encountered an immense pushback from
financial industry groups'99 that have protested that the new Basel III
standards will seriously "hinder credit availability, dampen economic
growth and harm the competitiveness of the U.S. banking system." 200
Notable among the groups protesting the new regulations are the American
Bankers Association, Goldman Sachs and ICBA.20 1 It seems that financial
regulators have been persuaded by these concerns; although Basel III calls
for implementation of the capital requirements to begin in January 2013,
there has been indication on the part of financial regulators that they will
delay implementing many of the standards beyond the 2013 date.202
Furthermore, while U.S. regulators have placed pressure on the nineteen
largest U.S. banks to show that they are making efforts to comply with
Basel III, a firm date for compliance has yet to be established.20 3
Recent amendments to the Basel III liquidity requirements further
suggest that regulators are responsive to banks' difficulties in meeting the
new regulations.204 Seeking to avoid another credit crunch that would cause
banks to cut back on lending, regulators gave banks an additional four years
to comply with the LCR requirement2 05 and amended other provisions of
the liquidity regulations.20 6 Commentators viewed these concessions as a
major victory for the banking industry and took it as a sign that there will
be flexibility in the implementation of other regulatory measures.207 The
position that members of the BCBS has taken suggests a willingness to
allow for this more flexible approach to implementation.208 In spite of the
failure of the United Kingdom and United States to comply with the
199 Emily Stephenson, Delay Seen in Implementing US. Bank Capital Rules, Fox
Bus. (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/l 1/09/delay-seeh-in-
implementing-us-bank-capital-rules/.
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Basel III Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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rules.html (quoting a letter received during the public comment process).
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January go-date for many of the regulations, Ingves has said that these
delays are not critical at this point and has been receptive to concerns that
the original regulations were too complex. 209 Other regulators have
indicated that an acceptable timeframe for U.S. implementation of the new
standards would be within the next two years. 21 0 Regulators' willingness to
accept these delays suggest that the protests from the banking sector have
not fallen upon deaf ears.
The receptiveness of U.S. regulators to concerns from community
banks suggests the United States is also likely to adopt a more flexible
approach regarding small bank regulation.2 1 1 After receiving over 1500
letters on behalf of community bankers, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking has realized that there is a need to "tailor the requirements as
appropriate" to fit the needs of community banks.2 12 Specifically, there has
been some discussion that small banks should not be subject to the same
213
risk-weight models that will be used by their larger counterparts.
However, while there seems to be general agreement that minor exemptions
for community banks are permissible, many regulators are adamant that the
crux of the regulations should still apply.2 14 Although it seems doubtful that
regulators would approve less stringent risk-weight models for community
banks, it could have beneficial effects for small local businesses that rely
heavily on financing from these banks. 215 These small local businesses
would be considered high-risk under the conventional Basel III risk-weight
system.216
Although Basel III may cause some SMEs to turn to alternative sources
of financing such as venture capital,217 it is likely that most small businesses
will continue to rely predominantly on loans from banking institutions. In a
tough economy, individual investors, even more than financial institutions,
will likely think twice before shelling out their cash to high-risk SMEs and
startups. Like venture capitalists and angel investors, other alternative
209 Id
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lenders tend to be similarly risk-averse, leaving banks as the only viable
financing option, aside from the shadow banking sector. While shadow
banks are known for their willingness to take on high-risk investments,
most SMEs and startups cannot offer the high returns necessary to entice
shadow banks to invest. Furthermore, even with the possibility of less
stringent requirements for community banks,2 18 larger banks will be in a
better position to extend financing to SMEs219 due to their heightened
ability to engage in regulatory arbitrage and greater capital holdings.
Ultimately, the disproportionate impact of the regulations will result in
less competition between banks in the SME lending market, with large
banks dominating a greater percentage of the market in SME lending and
smaller banks being pushed to the sidelines. 220 According to data from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, before the financial crisis, the largest 100
banks in the United States had an 84% market share, but by the third
quarter of 2012, the top eighty-two U.S. banks held 88% of the market.22 1
Rather than moving away from a "too-big-to-fail" system, these numbers
show that just the opposite is occurring. 222 In January 2013, the twenty-five
largest U.S. banks witnessed the greatest number of withdrawals on
consumer deposits since the attacks on September 11, 2011-$114 billion
(approximately 2% of total deposits).223 This fact suggests that large banks
will continue to rely heavily on credit and lending practices, rather than
deposits, as a major source of revenue. Add the high capital costs imposed
by Basel III into the mix 224 and it seems certain that large banks will take
over a greater share of the SME lending market. In addition to the extra
charges associated with the increased capital requirements,2 25 decreased
competition will cause further rate surges in SME lending.
Although Basel III has generated a large amount of criticism from
politicians, financial regulators and prominent members of the banking
industry, the trend will be toward more stringent capital requirements for
banks.226 What is less certain is the time frame and methods by which the
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221 Should Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Be Carved Up?, INVESTOPEDIA ANALYST BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/zacks/shouldtoo-big-
to-failbanksbecarvedup-analystblog.aspx#axzz2JOw5xCUG.
222 id
223 Nick Summers, Withdrawn: $114 Billion From Big U.S. Banks, BusINESSWEEK
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-23/missing- 1l4-
billion-from-u-dot-s-dot-banks.224 See King & Tarbert, supra note 7.
225 SANTOS & ELLIOTr, supra note 86, at 4.
226 Hoenig, supra note 126; Hopkins & Hamilton, supra note 211.
2013 The Negative Impact of Basel III on 207
Small Business Financing
reforms will ultimately be implemented. 22 7 U.S. financial regulators' desire
to ease the transitional burdens and refusal to impose strict dates for
meeting the requirements suggests that banks will have a certain amount of
flexibility in complying with the new guidelines. 22 8 Greater flexibility in
implementing the Basel III rules may have the added benefit of easing some
of the negative economic consequences. While stricter capital requirements
will, at least to some extent, lead to a decrease in SME lending from U.S.
banks,229 careful and gradual implementation of the reforms may lessen
some of the adverse impacts.
It is doubtful that Basel III will either prove to be the calamity
prophesied by its harshest criticS2 30 or the "magic wand" solution touted by
its proponents.23 1 The moderated effect of Basel III may be largely
attributed to bank lobbying efforts, which have resulted in revision to many
of the more drastic provisions of the original regulations, including the
LCR.232 The new standards may result in tangible benefits in terms of
greater long-term stability in the banking sector; these benefits would be
particularly significant during times of economic stress.233 However, large
banks will likely capitalize on the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage left
open by the regulations, which will undermine this stability to some
extent.234 Furthermore, the creation of stability in the banking sector will
not come without some substantial costs. 23 5 Many small banks may fold
under the additional pressure of Basel III or may no longer be able to
continue SME lending practices.2 36 This will leave larger banks with the
lion's share of the SME credit market. The impact of all of this on small
businesses will be higher costs and reduced credit availability,237 which will
push some businesses out of the market.
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